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INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
AMONG FAMILY MEMBERS
CONSTANCE WARD COLE*
The family is one of the cornerstones of society.' Family relationships
are a source of great support and satisfaction for family members, 2 but these
ties can be a two-edged sword. Because family members are so interdepen-
dent, they are especially able to cause one another unhappiness and mental
distress.
3
This article will analyze intrafamily tort litigation, and particularly liti-
gation involving emotional distress brought upon one family member by an-
other. It discusses the development and historical limits placed on the
emotional distress tort, how the cause of action has been analyzed when
presented, and suggests an analysis that may overcome some difficulties in its
application in the family setting.
I. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort developed rather
late in the course of the common law. Traditionally, mental distress was
recognized as an element of damage when suffered as an incident to an al-
ready established tort4 or as a consequence of a direct physical injury.5
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University; B.A., 1971, Northwestern University;
M.A., 1972, University of Michigan; J.D., 1977, Northwestern University. The author thanks
Timothy Mohan for his valuable research assistance.
1. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage is a fundamental right); N. ACKER-
MAN, THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF FAMILY LIFE 15 (1958); N. BELL and E. VOGEL, A MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY 9-20 (rev. ed. 1968); G. SIMPSON, PEOPLE IN FAMILIES 31
(1960).
2. N. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 16: "Psychologically, the members of the family are
bound by mutual interdependence for the satisfaction of their respective affectional needs.";
Benedek, The Emotional Structure ofthe Family, in THE FAMILY: ITS FUNCTION AND DESTINY 358-
64, 378-80 (R. Anshen ed., rev. ed. 1959).
3. N. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 18, 22-23.
4. See Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937)
(battery); American Sec. Co. v. Cook, 49 Ga. App. 723, 176 S.E. 798 (1934) (trespass to land);
Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga. App. 778, 171 S.E. 470 (1933) (assault); Watson v. Dilts, 116
Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902) (trespass to land); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967
(1927) (invasion of right to privacy); DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881)
(deceit); Continental Casualty Co. v. Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753 (1935) (trespass to
land); Shellabarger v. Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S.W. 1005 (1905) (nuisance); Kuregeweit v.
Kirby, 88 Neb. 72, 129 N.W. 177 (1910) (assault); Salisbury v. Poulson, 51 Utah 552, 172 P. 315
(1918) (false imprisonment).
5. Several early courts denied recovery unless the emotional distress was accompanied by
a direct physical injury. See St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901);
Herrick v. Evening Express Publishing Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 A.16 (1921), overruled, 269 A.2d
117 (1970); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899), overruled, 179 N.W.2d 390
(1970); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled, 176 N.E.2d 729
(1961); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958), overruled, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). See
also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 134 (1959).
Many courts following this rule, however, allowed large recoveries for "mental anguish"
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Mental distress alone, however, was not considered compensable in tort,
6
since such damage was argued to be too difficult to assess7 and too easily
feigned.8 Courts worried that they would be flooded with litigation, 9 and
argued that mental distress was not foreseeable damage for which a defend-
ant should be responsible.' 0
Despite such concerns, criticism grew" and in 1948 the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 46 recognized an independent cause of action for
outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress.' 2 Under this action a
defendant is subjected to liability by plaintiffs proof of four elements: de-
fendant's extreme and outrageous conduct,' 3 intended' 4 to cause 15 plaintiff
when accompanied by only a slight physical injury. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 50
(4th ed. 1971). See Ragsdale v. Ezell, 99 Ky. 236, 49 S.W. 775 (1899) (S700 for a hug and a kiss
"against her wish and by force"); Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884) ($1200 for
spitting in the face); Craker v. Chicago & North Western R.R. Co., 36 Wis. 657 (1875) (school
teacher who was kissed awarded $1,000 for her "terror and anxiety" as well as her "outraged
feeling and insulted virtue").
6. See Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Gefter v. Rosenthal,
384 Pa. 123, 119 A.2d 250 (1956); Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81
(1953); Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900). See also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100,
143 (1959).
7. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896), overruled, 176
N.E.2d at 730 (1961) ("If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established it
would naturally result . . . in cases . . . where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture or
speculation".) Seealso Chicago, B&Q R.R. v. Gelvin, 238 F. 14 (8th Cir. 1916); Cleveland C.C.
& St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900).
8. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354, (1896), overruled, Battalla v. New
York, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); Johnson v. Great Northern Ry., 107 Minn. 285, 119 N.W. 1061
(1909).
9. Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.,
151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled, Battalla v. New York, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); Hus-
ton v. Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 48, 61 A.1022 (1905), overruled, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Oehler v. L.
Bamberger & Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 1003, 135 A. 71, afl'd, 103 N.J.L. 703, 137 A. 425 (1926).
10. Oehler v. L. Bamberger & Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 1003, 135 A. 71,aftd, 103 N.J.L. 703, 137
A. 425 (1926); Justesen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 92 N.J.L. 257, 106 A. 137 (1919); Miller v. Balti-
more & O.S.W. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908) overruled, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
11. See Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); M.B.M.
Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff,
38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952). See also Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20
MICH. L. REv. 497 (1922); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional dis-
tress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if
he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time,
whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in
,bodily harm.
Id.
The tort will be referred to in this article as the intentional infliction of emotional distress
or the tort of outrage.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d (1965).
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community
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severe emotional distress.' 6 Today, the intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort is well established and recognized as an independent tort in most
United States jurisdictions.' 7
would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
"Outrageous!"
d.
14. In tort law, the intent element requires no ill-will or motive on the part of the defend-
ant to harm the plaintiff. Liability extends to both actually desired consequences and those
which the defendant, based on an objective standard, knew or should have known were substan-
tially certain to result from his conduct. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 8, at 31-32. Note that
section 46 also applies in situations where the defendant has acted recklessly, defined in section
500 as being "in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress
will follow." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment i (1965).
15. The causal concept has two aspects in tort law-cause in fact and proximate cause.
Defendant's action is a factual cause of an injury if it is a substantial factor in bringing it about.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). Proximate cause on the other hand connotes
policy limitations on liability. But, according to the court in DeRosier v. New England Tel. &
Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 464, 130 A.145, 152 (1925): "For an intended injury the law is astute to
discover even very remote causation."
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment j (1965).
Severe Emotional Distress
Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental
anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental
reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, cha-
grin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liabil-
ity arises. Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and
some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living
among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the
distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity ....
The distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there
is no liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional
distress, unless it results from a particular susceptibility to such distress of which the
actor has knowledge. See Comment f.
17. A partial listing of these jurisdictions may be found in Note, Torts." An Analysis of Mental
Distress as an Element of Damages and as a Basis of an Independent Cause of Action When Intentionaly
Caused, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 106, 107-08 (1980). The following jurisdictions have adopted the
intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort as of this writing:
Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939); American Road Serv-
ice Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361 (Ala. 1980) (dicta); Savage v. Boles, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349
(1954); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r,
Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 439, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970); Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 476
P.2d 753 (1970); Hiers v. Cohen, 31 Conn. Supp. 305, 329 A.2d 609 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973);
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sheehan, 373 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Dunn v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons N.W., 100
Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind. App. 576, 12 N.E.2d 360 (1938); Curnett v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683,
57 N.W.2d 915 (1953); Dawson v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 215 Kan. 814, 529 P.2d 104 (1974);
Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Quina v. Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558
(La. Ct. App. 1944); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979); Harris v.
Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977) (dicta); Agis v. Howard Johnson, Co., 371 Mass. 140,
355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); Warren v. June's Mobil Home Village & Sales, Inc., 66 Mich. App. 386,
239 N.W.2d 380 (1976); Saenger Theatres Corp. v. Herndon, 180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86 (1938);
Labrier v. Anheuser Ford, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. App. 1981); LaSalle Extension Univ. v.
Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457,253 N.W. 424 (1934); Burrus v. Nevada, Cal., Or. R.R., 38 Nev. 156, 145
P. 926 (1915), error dimtssed, 244 U.S. 103 (1917); Hume v. Bayer, 178 N.J. Super. 310, 428 A.2d
966 (1981) (dicta); Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991
(1978) (dicta); Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981); Mashunkashey v.
Mashunkashey, 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190 (1941); Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28
(1971); Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963); Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157,
276 S.E.2d 776 (1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Bragdon, 84 S.D. 89, 167 N.W.2d 381 (1969); Medlin
v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn, 469, 398 S.W.2d 270 (1966) (dicta); Stafford v. Steward, 295
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Intentional infliction of emotional distress has been plead in a wide va-
riety of situations.' 8 As illustration, creditors have been subjected to liability
for particularly oppressive collection practices, 19 landlords have been held
liable for harrassing unwanted tenants, 20 and an ambulance service operator
who refused to dispatch an ambulance for plaintiffs critically ill wife for a
petty reason, was found liable by a jury on the tort of outrage.
2'
II. HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS ON EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF
ACTION
A. Intrafamilial Immunities
The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort has appeared infre-
quently in intrafamily litigation and when it has, it often has been given a
chilly reception. 22 One factor undoubtedly influencing this dearth of in-
trafamily emotional distress suits has been the prevalence of intrafamily
immunities.
At common law, this immunity precluded suit by either spouse because
the woman was viewed as having lost her separate indentity at marriage and
could not sue without joining her husband.23 Thus, the husband would be
S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916); Sheltra v.
Smith, 136 Vt. 472, 392 A.2d 431 (1978); Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145
(1974); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977); Harless v.
First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W.Va. 1982); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d
312 (1963).
18. Se, e.g., Holmes v. Oxford Chemicals Inc., 510 F. Supp. 915 (M.D. Ala. 1981), aft'd,
672 F.2d 854 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (employer reduced worker's disability payments from $500 to
$49.10 per month); Jones v. Musician's Union Local No. 6, 446 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(musician denied tenure with symphony orchestra by union vote); Peddycoart v. City of Bir-
mingham, 392 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 1980) (parents told incorrectly that their son had committed
suicide while in jail); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952) (threats to beat plaintiff, destroy his trucks and ruin his business unless he turned over
the proceeds from the territory of an association member); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Roch, 160
Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1930) (defendant wrapped up a dead rat instead of a loaf of bread for a
sensitive plaintiff); Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981) (plaintiff hand-
cuffed, beaten, threatened with bodily harm and told to leave the state or be killed); Goldfarb v.
Baker, 547 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. 1977) (university professor wrongfully accused plaintiff of strik-
ing him with a pie in the face and of attempted blackmail); Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96
Wis. 2d 663, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980) (parents bring action for wrongful performance of an
autopsy on their deceased son).
19. Se, e.g., Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948) (defend-
ant's agent suggested to plaintiff that he would "take it out in trade" if she was unable to pay
her bill); Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932) (widow
threatened with suit unless she paid her bills); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808,
188 S.E. 625 (1936) (pregnant woman called "deadbeat" by collection agent and threatened
with arrest); Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, Inc., 270 Or. 443, 568 P.2d 1382 (1977) (blind
woman called "scum" and "deadbeat" by collection agency hired by her eye clinic); Duty v.
General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) (daily telephone calls, telegrams and
letters, threats of job loss, telling neighbors plaintiffs were "deadbeats", harassing plaintiffs at
work, calling their relatives, etc.).
20. See Kaufman v. Abramson, 363 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1966); Newby v. Alto Riviera Apart-
ments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1976); Duncan v. Donnell, 12 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928); Nordgren v. Lawrence, 74 Wash. 305, 133 P. 436 (1913).
21. DeCicco v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 40 Colo. App. 63, 573 P.2d 559 (1977).
22. See in/fa note 58 and accompanying text.
23. See Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 (1861); Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156 (1866); Den-
gate v. Gardner, 4 M. & W. 5, 150 Eng. Rep. 1320 (1838).
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on both sides of any lawsuit by his wife against him.
This immunity was somewhat restricted when, beginning around 1844,
the Married Women's Acts were passed in every jurisdiction, giving a mar-
ried woman a separate legal identity. 24 These statutes usually were con-
strued to allow a suit against the woman's husband for torts against her
property, 25 but not for torts against her personal interests. 26 This inter-
spousal immunity was justified by a number of rationales: preservation of
domestic tranquility, 27 prevention of a flood of litigation, 28 availability of
other remedies such as divorce and criminal actions,2 9 protection of insurers
from collusive suits, 30 and fear that the tortfeasor would share in the in-
surer's payment.
3 1
24. For a compilation of these laws see 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW §§ 167,
179, 180 (1935).
25. See Adams v. Adams, 51 Conn. 135 (1883) (fraud); Hubbard v. Ruff, 97 Ga. App. 251,
103 S.E.2d 134 (1958) (negligent damage to property); Crater v. Crater, 118 Ind. 521, 21 N.E.
290 (1888) (ejectment); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 154 Mich. 100, 117 N.W. 598 (1908)
(conversion).
26. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910) (assault and battery); Faris v. Hope,
298 F.727 (8th Cir. 1924) (defamation); Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923
(1945) (malicious prosecution); Campbell v. Campbell, 145 W. Va. 245, 114 S.E.2d 406 (1960)
(negligent personal injury).
27. In Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396 (1858) the court stated: "The flames which litigation
would kindle on the domestic hearth would consume in an instant the conjugal bond, and bring
on a new era indeed - an era of universal discord, of unchastity, of bastardy, of dissoluteness, of
violence, cruelty, and murders." Id. at 398, quotedtn Comment, Tort Liabihty Between Husbandand
Wife: The Interspousal Immuniy Doctrine, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 423, 433 (1966). See Thompson v.
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950); David v. David,
161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932); Patenaude v Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935),
overruled, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Kennedy v. Camp. 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954);
Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 367 (N.Y. 1863).
28. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617-18 (1910); Mims v. Mims, 305 So. 2d
787, 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1950); Bandfield
v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W.287, 288 (1898). But see Brown v. Brown, 381 Mass. 231,
409 N.E.2d 717, 718 (1980) (allowing wife recovery for husband's negligence in failing to shovel
sidewalk after a snowstorm). See generally Moore, The Case for Retention of Interspousal Tort Immu-
nity, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 943, 948-50 (1980).
29. In Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910), Justice Day, writing for the majority,
stated:
Nor is the wife left without remedy for such wrongs. She may resort to the criminal
courts, which, it is to be presumed, will inflict punishment commensurate with the
offense committed. She may sue for divorce or separation and for alimony. The court
in protecting her rights and awarding relief in such cases may consider, and, so far as
possible, redress her wrongs and protect her rights.
Id. at 619. See also Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877) (wife could not sue
husband civilly for assault because criminal court was available to an assaulted wife); Drake v.
Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920) (husband could not sue wife in tort because divorce
was the appropriate remedy). See generally Comment, supra note 27, at 436-37 (divorce courts
and criminal courts furnish ample redress to the husband and wife).
30. See Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20, 22 (1924); Newton
v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y.S. 113, 114 (1922); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208
N.E.2d 533, 535 (1965); Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 383 N.E.2d 888, 889-90
(1978); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287 P.2d 572, 583 (1955); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah
2d 344, 384 P.2d 389, 390-92 (1963). But see Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26
Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (finding the possibility of insurance fraud unconvincing as a justification
for denying a spouse recovery).
31. See Burns v. Burns, 111 Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717, 719 (1974); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14
Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389, 391 (1963). See generally Moore, supra note 28, at 947 (since a hus-
band or wife who has obtained a tort judgment against his spouse can continue to cohabitate
DENVER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:3
Dissatisfaction with these rationales has been well documented by legal
commentators3 2 and reflected by vigorous court action. In fact, twenty-nine
jurisdictions have abolished the interspousal immunity rule entirely, 33 and
five more apparently have abolished interspousal immunity where inten-
tional torts are involved. 34 Because of the abolition of these immunities a
woman now may sue her husband for infringements of property or personal
interests.
Similarly, immunity developed between parent and child.35 This im-
munity was justified by concerns of collusive suits36 because the parent or
child might inherit from the other's estate undermining parental authority,
37
upsetting the allocation of family resources, 38 and destroying family unity.3 9
As with interspousal immunity, these justifications have been found insuffi-
cient,40 and parent-child immunity has been abolished generally in at least
seventeen jurisdictions. 4' Eight other states appear to except intentional
torts from the immunity.
42
with the latter, it is unrealistic to assume that the tortfeasor will not share in the benefits of an
award paid by the defendant's insurance company).
32. See, e.g., Farage, Recoveryfor Torts Between Spouses, 10 IND. L.J. 290, 302-03 (1934); Kahn-
Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and Wife, 15 MOD. L. REV. 133, 154
(1952); McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303, 306-07 (1959); Mc-
Curdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1033-35 (1930); Com-
ment, Tort Liability Within the Family Area, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 610, 618-20 (1956); Comment,
supra note 27, at 455-56; But see Moore, supra note 28, at 951-53 (the reasons for retaining inter-
spousal immunity has substance while the arguments promoting abrogation of the doctrine are
unconvincing). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F (1979) (rejecting the
immunity of one spouse from liability in tort to the other).
33. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F, app. §§ 841-end, at 287-91
(1979) for a list of jurisdictions that have abrogated the interspousal immunity rule.
34. See Windauer v. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157-58 (1971) (after divorce);
LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963); Apitz v. Dames, 205
Or. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977), appeal after new
trial, 611 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1980); Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954) (divorce
pending).
35. See Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111
Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P.788 (1905).
36. See, e.g., Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968); Thomas v. Inmon, 268
Ark. 221, 594 S.W.2d 853 (1980); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968);
Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
37. See, e.g., Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Small v. Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963); Wick v.
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
38. See, e.g., Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
39. See, e.g., Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 594 S.W.2d 853 (1980); Shaker v. Shaker, 129
Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963); Wick v.
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo, 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
40. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471
P.2d 282 (1970); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1,
199 N.W.2d 169 (1922); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Briere v. Briere,
107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Felderhoff
v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 197 1). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G
(1979) (rejecting the immunity from liability in tort between parent and child).
41. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G, app. §§ 841-end, at 292-94
(1979) for a list of jurisdictions that have abrogated the parent-child immunity rule.
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G comment e (1979); Wright v. Wright,
85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Il. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525
(1956); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330
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These historical immunities between spouses, and parent and child,
have crumbled slowly. The majority of jurisdictions currently allow suits
between family members where the basis of the action is an intentional
tort.43 Yet, even where immunities are abrogated, the parameters of the
duty between the parties still need definition. Although most courts today
condemn intrafamily physical abuse without hesitation, many show little
concern over intentional emotional harm.
B. Abolishing Familial Causes of Action
Recently, courts and legislatures have dealt cautiously with emotional
injury in the family setting by abolishing the causes of action for criminal
conversation and alienation of affections. 44 Traditionally, the criminal con-
versation action has protected a plaintiff's interest in exclusive sexual inter-
course with his or her spouse45 and the alienation of affections tort has
protected plaintiff's interest in his or her spouse's affection and emotional
involvement. 46 The criminal conversation tort is directed at adultery while
an alienation of affections action more broadly protects the marriage from
intentional interference. Damages awarded in these actions often have in-
cluded compensation for injury to plaintiff's feelings and reputation.47 Soci-
ety's interest in strengthening marital bonds serve as justification for these
actions.
48
Over time, whether that policy was furthered by the cause of action was
questioned. 49 Concerns developed that it was difficult for juries to analyze
A.2d 335 (1974); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67
Wash. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965); Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971); Teramano v.
Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966).
43. Obviously, no suit for the intentional infliction of emotional distress will be allowed in
those jurisdictions currently retaining intrafamily immunities. One would expect this strong
trend toward abolition of the immunities to continue, and the "duty" issue addressed subse-
quently in this article will be pertinent in those jurisdictions currently retaining the immunities
as well.
44. Admittedly, eventually the typical defendant in an alienation of affections or criminal
conversation action is the third party with whom the spouse is involved. Yet, with the abroga-
tion of immunities, logically the participating spouse could be liable for plaintiff's loss as well.
See Kavanaugh, Alienation of Affctions and Criminal Conversation: Unholy Marriage in Need of Annul-
ment, 23 ARiz. L. REv. 323, 337-38 (1981) (analogizing to interference with contract suit against
original contracting party); Note, Mtor Child Has No Cause of Action Against Parent for Emotional
Harm Caused by Abandonment, 58 WASH. U.LQ. 189, 190-91 (1980) (suggesting analogy with
alienation of affections action when child sues parent for abandonment). But see Burnette v.
Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105, 1112 (1978) (alienation of affections action available only
against third party).
45. See Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 129-30 (Iowa 1978) (the tort of criminal
conversation has been abrogated in Iowa as to conduct occurring after January 1, 1978);
Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 469, 268 N.W.2d 582, 584 (1978); Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C.
App. 201, 209, 170 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1969). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 124, at 875.
46. See Harlow v. Harlow, 152 Va. 910, 939-40, 143 S.E. 720, 728 (1928).
47. Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537, 539 (1959); Vaughn v. Blackburn, 431
S.W.2d 887, 889 (Ky. 1968); Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 220, 170 S.E.2d 104, 111
(1969).
48. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Holliman, 74 Ga. App. 735, 41 S.E.2d 332 1947); Bearbower v.
Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978).
49. See, e.g., Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981); Moulin v. Montele-
one, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927); Thompson v. Chapman, 93 N.M. 356, 600 P.2d 302
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rationally the emotional situations,5 0 that the cause of action failed to pro-
tect the family, 51 that it fostered blackmail, 52 and that it appeared the plain-
tiff was selling the spouse's affections to a third-party buyer.5 3 As a result,
thirty states and the District of Columbia have either abrogated or restricted
the alienation of affections action 54 and twenty-two states and the District of
Columbia have abolished the criminal conversation tort.
55
This trend obviously indicates little concern with emotional injury to
family relational interests. Certain rationales underlying the trend, such as
concern with jury prejudice and the negative effect on the family, do counsel
against an emotional distress action. But more arguably, the trend toward
abrogation of these actions when they are directed at third parties indicates
a concern with blackmail, an obvious abuse of the actions.56 Even if these
concerns justify abolition of third-party alienation of affections actions, they
do not justify a blanket denial of intentional infliction of emotional distress
actions.
57
III. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ACTION IN FAMILY SETTINGS
Very few actions for emotional distress within the family have suc-
ceeded. 58 Reported cases run the gamut from complaints about a defendant
(1979); Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1973) (Steakley, J., dissenting); Wyman
v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980).
50. Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 105, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980).
51. See Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 1981); Wyman v. Wallace,
94 Wash. 2d 99, 105, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980).
52. See Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 195, 115 So. 447, 457 (1927); Morgan v. Yar-
borough, 5 La. Ann. 316, 323 (1850) (breach of promise to marry); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa.
272, 280, 365 A.2d 147, 151 (1976); Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 105, 615 P.2d 452, 455
(1980).
53. See Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Iowa 1981); Wyman v. Wallace,
94 Wash. 2d 99, 105, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (1980).
54. For a list of jurisdictions that have abolished or limited the alienation of affections
action, see Kavanaugh, supra note 45, at 330-31 n.62.
55. For a list of jurisdictions that have abolished or limited the criminal conversation ac-
tion, see Kavanaugh, supra note 45, at 331 n.63.
56. See F. HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 169 (1952); Note, The Case for Retention of
Causes of Action for Intentional Interference with the Marital Relationship, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 426,
430 (1972).
57. In Van Meter v. Van Meter, 328 N.W.2d 497 (Iowa 1983) the court refused to dismiss
a claim for infliction of emotional distress and concluded:
The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and some of
its policy considerations, are different from those in an alienation claim. We cannot
conclude as a matter of law that no facts are conceivable under which a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress could be maintained merely because it, like
alienation claims, arises out of a failed marital relationship.
Id. at 498.
See also Comment, Loss of Consortium and Intentional Infiction of Emotional Dstress. Alternatve Theo-
ries to Alenation of Affections, 67 IOWA L. REv. 859, 873-74 (1982).
58. Cases discussed involve suits between parent and child, between husband and wife and
between ex-spouses. The inclusion of the latter category indicates that the subject of this article
is more correctly understood as emotional distress arising out of the family relationship. In fact,
the type of relationship existing between the parties and whether or not the distress arises from
that relationship is relevant to how the case should be analyzed. Unfortunately, judicial deci-
sions have failed to make these distinctions, and this failure has added to the confusion in the
area. See infta text accompanying notes 142-47.
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telling his spouse he no longer loved her,5 9 failure to pay alimony, 60 failure
to abide by a visitation schedule,6 ' to complaints about child snatching.
62
Unfortunately, a coherent analysis has not been applied in many of these
cases, perhaps explaining the judicial reluctance to recognize that family
members can, and do, inflict emotional distress upon one another.
Court decisions refusing to recognize the propriety of an intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress action in the family are plentiful. Exemplifying
this judicial reluctance is Browning v. Browning,63 where plaintiff husband
sued his wife and her companion for alienation of affections and intentional
infliction of emotional distress because of defendants' extra-marital affair.
Although the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the emo-
tional distress cause of action, it gave little reasoning for its decision, noting
that in spite of recent trends recognizing the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress cause of action, public policy would not be served by recogniz-
ing a cause of action on these facts. 64 Instead of articulating these public
policies, the court concluded only that "the morals of mankind are more
perfectly judged by a court having a final and eternal jurisdiction.
' ' 6 5
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals in Weicker v. Wecker 66 con-
cluded that to allow an action for the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress in the area of matrimonial difficulties would revive the evils of the
alienation of affections and criminal conversation torts. The court affirmed
the appellate court's reversal 67 of the trial court's conclusion 6 that plaintiff
had a cause of action for her emotional distress suffered when her husband
got an illegal Mexican divorce, remarried and held out another woman as
his wife. Citing Weicker's reasoning, the court in Wiener v. Wiener 69 also con-
cluded the counterclaimant wife had not stated a cause of action on allega-
tions that her husband was abusive, told her he no longer loved her, and cut
off her financial control.
In McGrady v. Rosenbaum,7° the court held that a father's complaint that
his ex-wife caused him mental distress by moving out of state with his child,
in violation of a custody decree, was not appropriately resolved in an action
for damages. Allegations in Friedman v. Friedman 71 that defendant failed to
abide by the visitation provisions of the divorce decree met a similar fate.
59. Wiener v. Wiener, 84 A.D.2d 814, 444 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1981).
60. Deibel v. Deibel, 512 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
61. Friedman v. Friedman, 79 Misc. 2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1974).
62. Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See mnfra text accompanying notes
76-109.
63. 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
64. Id. at 408.
65. Id.
66. 22 N.Y.2d 28, 237 N.E.2d 876, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1968).
67. 28 A.D.2d 138, 283 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1967).
68. 53 Misc. 2d 570, 279 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1967).
69. 84 A.D.2d 814, 444 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1981). While the court seemed to consider the out-
rageousness of defendant's conduct, it is quite clear it was merely saying these claims are for the
divorce court: "The bounds [of decency] in marital relationships are obviously circumscribed
by the availability of another cause of action (i.e. a matrimonial action) and the abolition of
causes for alienation of affections and criminal conversation." Id. at 815.
70. 62 Misc. 2d 182, 308 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1970), afdmem., 324 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1971).
71. 70 Misc. 2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1974).
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Husbands and wives have not been the only intrafamily litigators. In
Burnette v. Wahl, 72 several children sued their mothers for emotional injury
suffered because of abandonment of the plaintiffs. Again the court decided
that while the abandonment might be certain to cause mental distress, the
tort was not applicable to the parent-child relationship. Accordingly, the
court held that:
If there is ever a field in which juries and general trial courts are ill
equipped to do social engineering, it is in the realm of the emo-
tional relationship between mother and child. It is best we leave
such matters to other fields of endeavor. There are certain kinds of
relationships which are not proper fodder for tort litigation, and we
believe this to be one of them.
73
The court expressed the concern that if such an action were recognized in
this situation, then in any divorce action a parent would be liable to his or
her child for emotional distress suffered because of the divorce.
74
The lack of substantive analysis in these cases is apparent, since the
emotional distress cause of action frequently is denied on vague policy
grounds and by analogy to the often abolished cause of action for alienation
of affections. Yet, as noted earlier, 75 the emotional distress action addresses
different interests and is not subject to much of the criticism directed at the
alienation of affections action.
Some courts have at least attempted to analyze the plaintiffs complaint
or evidence in terms of the elements of the emotional distress tort, although
such efforts often are muddled or conclusory. Even though these decisions
have failed to clearly specify the standards of liability, they implicitly recog-
nize the emotional distress cause of action in the family arena.
A. DEPRIVATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The emotional distress tort recently has been used successfully as a rem-
edy for victims of child snatching in a significant number of jurisdictions.
This tort has been used against child-snatching parents, and also against
those who aid the abducting parent.7 6 A tort-based suit potentially affords
the victimized plaintiff the most complete compensation for his or her dam-
ages-costs incurred in attempting to recover the child and damages for
mental distress. And a tort suit may be more effective in prompting the
return of the child than other remedies.
In fact, the significance of the tort remedy grows when compared with
other available remedies. Although most states have felony kidnapping stat-
utes condemning parental kidnapping, 77 even if a felony conviction results
in the return of the child, no costs or mental distress damages are recover-
72. 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
73. Id. at 1111, 284 Or. at 716.
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 90-109.
77. For a list of state kidnapping statutes, see P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK, & J.
O'DANIEL, INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: POLICY,
PRACTICE AND LAW, app. IV (1982).
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able. 78 As additional deterrents to kidnapping, the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) 79 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA)80 were enacted. The UCCJA has attempted to limit child custody
jurisdiction to one state to prevent forum shopping,8 1 while the PKPA
would neutralize a major motive for kidnapping by requiring states to honor
sister states' custody decrees.
82
Additionally, both acts provide for the recovery of attorney's fees and
expenses in recovering a child when a parent has violated a custody decree.
8 3
The PKPA authorizes FBI assistance in locating an abductor who leaves the
state with the child 84 and the use of the Federal Parent Locator Service
(FPLS), which can provide information about a parent working under his or
her own name anywhere in the United States.
85
Unfortunately, even these acts are of limited utility.86 Although the
UCCJA and PKPA remedies provide compensation to a victimized parent,
the tort remedy's damages are more inclusive and the defendant group is
larger. Where other remedies may reimburse plaintiffs costs, tort cases have
allowed out of pocket expenses,8 7 damages for mental and emotional dis-
tress,8 8 and punitive damages. 89 While other remedies may influence only
remotely the return of the child, the tort remedy's defendant group is
78. Id See also KATz, CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF
CHILDREN 102 (1981).
79. 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979).
80. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat.
3568-73 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 655,
663 (1982)).
81. Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem." A Reply to Professor
Currie anda Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 197 (1965); UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. 122
(1979).
82. PKPA § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
83. UCCJA §§ 7(g), 8(c), 15(b), 9 U.L.A. 138-59 (1979); PKPA § 8(c), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(1982).
84. PKPA § 10(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1073(a) (1982).
85. PKPA § 9(b), 42 U.S.C. § 663 (1982).
86. The UCCJA and PKPA are not applicable until a custody decree has been entered,
and many kidnappings occur pre-decree. See Note, Tortious Interference with Custody. An Action to
Supplement Iowa Statutor Deterrents to Child Snatching, 68 IOwA L. REV. 495, 511 (1983). The
UCCJA does not require states to give sister state decrees full faith and credit. Moreover,
flexible standards to determine jurisdiction create the opportunity for abuse, and the UCCJA
lacks sanctions to remedy violations. See Note, Child Snatching: The Federal Response, 33 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 1103, 1113-14 (1982); see generally Hudak, Seiie, Run, and Sue. The Ignominy of Inter-
state Child Custody Litigation in American Courts, 39 Mo. L. REV. 521, 547 (1974); Note, Preventin of
Child Stealing: The Need For a National Policy, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 829, 840-41, 857 (1970); Note,
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. Constitutionality and Effectiveness, 33 CASE W. RES. 89, 94
(1982).
Under the PKPA, FBI assistance is authorized only where a state felony arrest warrant has
been issued, and not all states treat child snatching as a felony. HOFF, SCHULMAN, VOLENIK &
O'DANIEL, supra note 77, at 8-19. Moreover, Department of Justice policy has limited FBI
involvement to situations where the child is threatened with imminent physical injury. Such
proof will be difficult for the victimized parent. See Note, The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act-
Analysts and Impact on Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 553, 584-86
(1981). The Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) is not directly available to parents and
their attorneys but only to authorized officials who must be persuaded to take action. Id. at 588.
87. Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 20 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ($5,000 awarded for legal fees
incurred in attempting to retrieve child).
88. Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (E.D. Wis.),afd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982)
(S30,000 award for emotional distress).
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broader and may include relatives of the snatching parent who aided in the
abduction. Defendants who are still available to the court will have a strong
motivation to disclose the child's location to avoid litigation or mounting
damages for a continuing violation. 90 Consequently, it appears that a tort
remedy may more fully compensate plaintiff for past emotional distress suf-
fered and may prevent continuing mental harm by prompting the return of
the child.
Historically, theories of tort recovery have varied in name, but over-
lapped significantly in substance. A number of cases have relied on the in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. A 1930 decision in New York, Pickle
v. Page,9' recognzied that in a child abduction: "The true ground of action
is outrage and deprivation; the injury the father sustains in the loss of his
child; the insult offered to his feelings, the heart-rending agony he must suf-
fer in the destruction of his dearest hopes."
'92
More recently, in Kajtazi v. Kayiazi,93 the mother awarded custody
pending divorce sued her husband and his relatives for their role in her hus-
band's abduction of her child to Yugoslavia. The mother, on her own behalf
and as guardian ad litem for the child, alleged defendants' false imprison-
ment, intentional infliction of mental suffering, prima facie tort and civil
conspiracy. The district court dismissed the latter two causes of action re-
spectively, as duplicative and not recognized in New York. It awarded
plaintiffs general and punitive damages of $176,430 and $5,000 legal ex-
penses on the other counts, noting that:
It is difficult to conceive of intentional conduct more calculated to
cause severe emotional distress than the outrageous conduct of the
defendant, Fabian, in surreptitiously abducting the infant from his
mother, who had legal custody, and falsely imprisoning him in Yu-
goslavia. This outrageous conduct constitutes the distinct tort of
intentional infliction of mental suffering under New York deci-
sional law.
94
The court in Wasserman v. Wasserman 95 reversed a trial court's dismissal
of plaintiffs claims of child enticement, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and civil conspiracy based on the father's abduction of his three
children. Although the court concluded the allegations were not within the
domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, 96 it found that
89. Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980) (various defendants assessed
$65,000 in punitive damages).
90. See HOFF, SCHULMAN, VOLENIK & O'DANIEL, supra note 77, at 14-2. For example, in
Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis), aj'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982), $2000
per month was assessed against the kidnapping mother and her husband for every month the
child was not returned. This kind of award could be made against remaining relatives who
aided in the abduction and who know the child's whereabouts. The appellate court, in dicta,
however, suggested this type of award might be within the domestic relations exception. 694
F.2d at 493-94. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
91. 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930).
92. Id. at 480, 169 N.E. at 652.
93. 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
94. Id. at 20.
95. 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982).
96. Id. at 834-35. The federal courts have long considered the granting of divorces and the
determination of custody to be outside diversity jurisdiction. This doctrine, the domestic rela-
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the complaint stated generally cognizable common law torts. Similarly, the
Vermont Supreme Court found 97 a cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress where a mother alleged she had been denied communi-
cation with her daughter for three weeks.98
Most recently, a jury in Cramler v. Donahue 99 returned a verdict against
defendants' 0 0 for $5,900,000 based on claims of tortious interference with
custody, civil conspiracy and outrageous conduct. A number of other cases
have relied on the tort of custodial interference, citing Restatement (Second)
of Torts Section 700,101 instead of the infliction of mental distress tort.
While the tort of custodial interference had its origins in the loss of service
suffered by the deprived parent, 10 2 such loss of service is no longer a neces-
sary element of the cause of action: "The deprivation to the parent of the
society of the child is itself an injury that the law redresses.'' 10 3 Although the
custodial interference cause of action provides damages for loss of service if
such has occurred, the more significant damages aspect appears to be for
emotional distress and expenses incurred in regaining custody. 10 4 Thus, the
overlap with the emotional distress cause of action is obvious. 105
tions exception, arose from interpretations of dicta in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582,
584 (1858) and Ex Porte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890). While many family questions are thus
excluded from the federal courts, some issues are considered sufficiently removed from the mari-
tal relationship so as to fall outside the exception. Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1087-89 (4th Cir.
1980) (claims of malicious prosecution, arson, conspiracy and conversion).
97. Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431 (Vt. 1978).
98. Id. at 432.
99. 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2452 (D. Colo. May 13, 1983).
100. The defendants originally were Phil Donahue, other members of the show's staff, and
the broadcast corporation involved with the Donahue Show. Donahue and the employees were
dropped from the suit. Plaintiff alleged the television defendants withheld information from
her regarding her son's whereabouts.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977).
Causing Minor Child to Leave or not to Return Home. One who, with knowledge
that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor
child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent after
it has been left him, is subject to liability to the parent.
Id.
102. Note, Tortious Interference with Custody. An Action to Supplement Iowa Statutory Deterrents to
Child Snatching, 68 IowA L. REV. 495, 508 (1983); Rice v. Nickerson, 91 Mass. 478, 481 (1864)
(damages for expenses).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700, comment d (1977). As early as 1877, the
Ohio Supreme Court commented, "Actual loss of services is not an essential allegation to enable
plaintiff to maintain his (custodial interference) action. Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 313
(1877).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700, comment g (1977).
The parent can recover for the loss of society of his child and for his emotional distress
resulting from its abduction or enticement. If there has been a loss of service or if the
child, though actually not performing service, was old enough to do so, the parent can
recover for the loss of the service that he could have required of the child during the
period of its absence.
Id.
105. While section 46, outlining the emotional distress tort, supra note 12, is broader in the
conduct it condemns, section 700 theoretically would allow recovery for an interference of short
duration where section 46 may not. See Note, Abduction of Child by Noncustodial Parent: Damages for
Custodial Parent's Mental Distress, 46 Mo. L. REV. 829, 834 (1981). On the other hand, the tort of
custodial interference may not be applicable until a custody decree has been entered, but the
emotional distress tort would cover pre-decree situations.
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In Lloyd v. Loefter,' 0 6 a Wisconsin district court concluded plaintiff had
stated a cause of action for civil conspiracy under Wisconsin law against his
ex-wife and certain of her family members for abduction and concealment of
his child. The court decided defendants owed a duty to plaintiff, citing Sec-
tion 700 and state criminal statutes against custodial interference. The com-
pensatory damages of $95,000 later awarded by the court to plaintiff
included $30,000 for emotional distress, and plaintiff also was to receive
$2000 per month until his child was returned.
In Fenslage v. Dawkn'ts, 107 a father refused to return his children to the
custodial mother after summer visitation and fled to Canada. The mother
alleged civil conspiracy and the intentional infliction of mental anguish
through custodial interference. The jury, awarding her $65,000 in compen-
satory damages, concluded the defendant father and his relatives had con-
spired to remove the children from the state in violation of a custody decree,
had actively concealed their whereabouts, and intentionally caused the
mother to suffer mental distress. The District of Columbia also has recog-
nized the cause of action for custodial interference. 108 Moreover, a Louisi-
ana Court' 0 9 not only affirmed a judgment for plaintiff, reasoning that the
abducting wife had violated the state's kidnapping statute and breached a
duty owed to the father, but also increased the damages.
B. OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION FOR THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WITHIN THE FAMILY
Although these cases above dealt with the tort elements in a conclusory
manner, at least they exhibited a rational structure for analysis. A number
of other cases dealing with additional aspects of family life have affirmed
causes of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Stanback v. Slanback i 1o held that
plaintiffs allegations of outrageous conduct in breach of their separation
agreement stated a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
against her husband. III Similarly, defendant's intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress was clearly involved in Mahnke v. Moore, 1 i2 although the court
chose to analyze the facts in terms of the negligent infliction of emotional
distress. In Mahnke, a child was found to have a cause of action against her
father's estate when he murdered her mother in front of her, left her with the
body for a week, and then committed suicide in her presence. Similarly, the
court's analysis is clouded in the 1914 case of Mashunkashey v.
Mashunkashey,' 3 since the tort of outrage was just developing at the time.
106. 539 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis.), aft'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
107. 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980).
108. Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
109. Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
110. 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
111. Id. at 205-06, 254 S.E.2d at 621. The issue of emotional distress arose unusually in this
case. The precise issue was whether the breach of contract, in this case a separation agreement,
was accompanied by an independent tort so as to support a punitive damage award.
112. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
113. 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190 (1914).
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The court did seem, however, to recognize an independent cause of action
for emotional distress when defendant husband tricked plaintiff into a biga-
mous marriage.' 14
In Johannes v. Sloan,15 plaintiff father, the non-custodial spouse, was
awarded $150,000 for the severe emotional distress he suffered after being
deprived of his visitation rights. The Family Law Reporter also cites a jury
verdict for a father based on his wife's interference with his visitation rights
and her malicious alienation of his children. 116 Similarly, in Rodgers v. Rod-
gers, 117 plaintiff's allegations of emotional distress suffered because of his
wife's interference with visitation survived a motion to dismiss.
Some courts, after analyzing the acts of a suit alleging the intentional
infliction of emotional distress, concluded certain necessary elements were
missing, and dismissed the claims. Such was the case in Hansen v. Hansen,' i8
where a child sued his mother for intentional infliction of emotional distress
because they had a fight over his drug usage, and thereafter she sent him
away to school. The mother's summary judgment motion was granted since
the court found no issue of fact as to whether the mother's conduct was out-
rageous, one of the tort's essential elements. In Deibel v. Dezbel,' '9 where the
plaintiff wife alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress by the de-
fendant due to his failure to pay alimony, the court dismissed because de-
fendant's failure to pay was not outrageous behavior as a matter of law.
Lifewise, the court in Przybla v. Przybla, 120 dismissed plaintiff's complaint
where he alleged the intentional infliction of emotional distress after his wife
had an abortion against his wishes. Because defendant was exercising her
constitutional right to abort,'21 the court reasoned her behavior could not be
termed extreme or outrageous.
The court in Vance v. Vance,' 22 on unusual facts, concentrated on an-
other element of the emotional distress tort. Defendant husband told his
wife their twenty-year marriage was invalid and that he was marrying an-
other woman. The court concluded that the husband's concealment of the
truth twenty years earlier, the behavior plaintiff complained of, could not
have intended plaintiff emotional distress since the husband could not have
foreseen the circumstances (that he wanted to marry another) in which the
truth would be revealed.
IV. A PERSPECTIVE ON THE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TORT IN THE
FAMILY SETTFIING
Although these decisions at least look to the substance of the emotional
114. Id. at 61, 113 P.2d at 191.
115. No. 79-L-169 (Kankakee County Cir. Ct., Mar 25, 1981).
116. 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2764 (1980).
117. No. 82-L-10593 (Cook County Cir. Ct., July 18, 1983).
118. 608 P.2d 364 (Colo. App. 1979).
119. 512 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
120. 87 Wis. 2d 441, 275 N.W.2d 112 (1978).
121. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 116, 154 (1973). The Court concluded that the right of per-
sonal privacy includes the decision to abort.
122. 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979).
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distress tort, their attention can best be described as fleeting. Such con-
clusory analysis, while preferable to cases finding the tort of emotional dis-
tress inapplicable, is of little help in understanding the tort's role in the
family setting.
Decisions in this area suffer from one of two problems-either they re-
fuse to recognize the propriety of an intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress action in the family arena, 123 or recognizing the cause of action, they
fail to specify clearly the standards of liability.1 24 Those courts which con-
clude the emotional distress tort is unavailable to family members 125 can cite
some support for their position.'
26
Why should injuries which are recognized between strangers or when
inflicted on a family member by a stranger 12 7 not be recognized between
family members? As submitted earlier, few logical reasons have been or can
be advanced.
In Burnelte v. Wahl,' 28 Linde, dissenting from the action's dismissal,
found certain of the majority's premises unsupportable. For example, he ar-
gued that the abandoned child, who has no cause of action against the de-
serting parent for emotional injury since such action could disrupt the
family, also should be barred from bringing physical injury suits, and is
not. 12 9 Moreover, he argued that the statutory breach of duty at the foun-
123. See supra text accompanying notes 63-75.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 76-122.
125. See 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); 22 N.Y.2d 28, 2, 237 N.E.2d 876, 290
N.Y.S.2d 732 (1968).
126. GREEN, PEDRICK, RAHL, THODE, HAWKINS AND SMITH, INJURIES TO RELATIONS 175
(1968). See also Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 493, 522: "Theoreti-
cally, a husband, as against a wife, has a legally recognized relational interest in her society and
services, and also in her support if he is indigent or infirm. Only her limited duty of support
lends itself to reasonably effective law enforcement. The husband's rights are operative only on
a moment to moment basis and the woman may withdraw her society, affections or services at
any time she pleases and the most the husband can do is to seek reinstatement in her favor,
retaliate in kind or get a divorce. The wife's rights are similar."
Relational interests are "the interests a person may have in his relations with other persons
.... .L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 413 (2d ed. 1977). From a broad
perspective (and apparently in the thoughts of the above-quoted authors) relational interests
may arise between the two parties to the relationship but they fall outside the law's protections
except as against interference by third persons. Green, however, states: "These inquiries do not
involve the simple two-party situations found in the protection of person and property. They
are always three-party situations; a relation which necessarily implies two persons, and a third
party who interferes with that relation." Id. at 417-18. He implies that the interests between
the two parties are of personality rot of relation. Emotional distress is usually considered injury
to personality, though such injury can also be viewed as parasitic damage when there has been
an injury to a relational interest, and is often the major element of such damage. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 700, comment g (1977). Whether we look at these family
situations in terms of injury to relations or personality, the limits on the action noted by Green
and Foster, supra, would be applicable.
127. For example, the abduction and enticement cases recognize the child's right to enjoy
the intangible benefits of family life. See, e.g., Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 34
Cal. Rptr. 479 (1963). See also Comment, Neghgent Injury to Family Relations: A Reevaluation of the
Logic of Lihbility, 77 Nw. L. REV. 794 (1983). Damages for loss of consortium also protect these
interests from negligent injury. Yet, the court in Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105
(1978), dismissed plaintiff's claims regarding the loss of such benefits.
128. 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
129. Id. at 723-31, 588 P.2d at 1115-19 (Linde, J., dissenting). Although Justice Linde felt
that a civil action could be implied from violation of a criminal statute, his analysis of the cited
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dation of the case "would not give rise to an expandable common law prece-
dent,"' 130 thereby negating the court's concern with suits arising from trivial
incidents.
Nor are any of the traditional objections to the emotional distress tort
any more applicable in the family situation than among strangers. 13 1 The
argument that proof is too difficult' 3 2 is still subject to the defense that simi-
lar damage determinations are made successfully in wrongful death actions.
Mental consequences from intrafamily torts are certainly no less foresee-
able' 33 than those arising from torts among strangers. In fact, such conse-
quences probably are more foreseeable. Perhaps the most valid criticism
"lies in the 'wide door' which might be opened not only to fictitious claims,
but to litigation in the field of trivialities .... ,,t34 The family setting may
provide more opportunity for trivial claims to arise, but that possibility "is a
poor reason for denying recovery for any genuine, serious mental injury."'
1 35
Although clearer guidelines for the imposition of liability may indeed be
necessary,' 36 this is far less drastic than denying the entire cause of action.
Closely related to the fear of a flood of trivial litigation is the theory that
family members have assumed the risk of or have impliedly consented to
most emotional injury by another family member.' 37 While "consent may
be assumed to the ordinary contacts of daily life,"' 38 it is difficult to infer
consent to abandonment or to failure to pay alimony. Moreover, even if
consent were to be implied to certain emotional "rough-housing," if defend-
ant exceeds that consent and does a substantially different act, such as com-
mit adultery, the consent is void.39 Since no rationale justifies the outright
denial of a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the approach followed by the court in Treschman v. Treschman, 140 is more
appropriate:
We quite agree with appellant's counsel that courts should hesitate
to invade the privacy of the home, or to question that mutual con-
fidence which should obtain in the household. But this privacy
and mutual confidence should not be permitted to shield an evil
points would have been relevant in establishing the outrageousness of defendant's behavior for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action as well.
130. 284 Or. at 730-31 n.5, 588 P.2d at 1119 n.5.
13 . See Guynn, Compensation for "Orphans of the Lwing'" An Evaluation of the Proposed Tort of
Abandonment, 18J. FAM. L. 501, 519-21, (1979).
132. See supra text accompanying note 7.
133. See supra text accompanying note 10.
134. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 51.
135. Id.
136. See infra text acompanying notes 152-97.
137. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relations, supra note 32, at 1078. If the injury
does not extend in its pecuniary effects beyond minority, there is perhaps no good purpose to be
served in permitting an action against the parent for pain, suffering, and injury to feelings,
unsupported by pecuniary damage, since these matters may well be considered as risks of the
relation, although such action may be maintained against third persons, at least for intentional
aggressions.
138. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 18, at 102. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 895F, comment h and § 895G, comment k (1977).
139. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 104.
140. 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E.961 (1901) (intentional physical injury).
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doer from the consequences flowing from a palpable wrong.141
A. "REAL" VERSUS "TANGENTIAL" FAMILY CASES
Admittedly, the cases discussed above are of little assistance in deter-
mining what are palpable wrongs justifying recovery. One preliminary
problem is the failure to distinguish those cases inherently dependent on
their family settings from those which only tangentially involve a family.
Where litigation only happens coincidentally to involve a family, the case
should be dealt with as any other emotional distress action. Yet, some of
these cases have been dismissed on vague family policy grounds.
In child-snatching cases, 142 for example, plaintiff is alleging defendant's
interference with his or her relationship with a child and the resulting emo-
tional distress, not a disruption of plaintiffs relationship with defendant.
Since defendant's position as plaintiff's spouse has no impact on plaintiff's
distress, and the child snatching and resultant distress could have been
caused by a stranger to the family setting, 14 3 no different analysis of defend-
ant's conduct is required because of the parties' relationship.
Analyzed from this perspective, cases alleging interference with visita-
tion rights of the non-custodial spouse 144 do state a valid claim. As in the
child-snatching cases, defendant is causing plaintiffs mental distress by in-
terference with plaintiffs relationship with a third party. There is a distinc-
tion between these types of cases, however, because it is hard to visualize how
a stranger to the relationship could interfere with visitation. Typically the
custodial ex-spouse causes the non-custodian distress. Even so, as in the
child-snatching cases, the distress suffered is not related to the plaintiff and
defendant's relationship, but to plaintiff's relationship with the child. Ac-
cordingly, it should be judged separately from the parties' family ties. Even
if the court disregards the parties' relationship, additional safeguards still
exist since the elements of an emotional distress action remain for analysis
and the plaintiff must meet the necessary burden of proof.' 45
Frequently, defendant interferes not with a relationship, but with some
financial expectancy 146 of plaintiff. Although that expectancy arises from a
prior relationship between the parties, the obligation is independent of that
relationship and a similar kind of obligation could arise among strangers.
The distress arises not because the parties are or were spouses, but because
defendant failed to pay plaintiff some money. The action ought not to be
barred because it is between ex-spouses, but ought to be compared with
analogous cases such as those alleging insurance companies' intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress by failure to pay claims. 14 7 On the basis of
141. Id. at 210-11, 61 N.E. at 963.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 91-109.
143. Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834-35, (4th Cir. 1982).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71, 115-17.
145. Plaintiff will have to show defendant intended to cause plaintiff's severe emotional
distress by his or her outrageous conduct. See supra note 12.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 110 and 119.
147. See Whitten v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 468 F. Supp. 470, 479 (D.S.C.
1977), aft'd, 594 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1979) (allegations failed to show outrageous conduct);
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particular facts, a jury may conclude the conduct has not been outrageous
and dismiss the cause of action, but the family tie is irrelevant in that
determination.
B. EMOTIONAL HARM ARISING FROM THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE LITIGANTS: "REAL" FAMILY CASES
Having eliminated one source of confusion by drawing the distinction
between "real" and "tangential" family cases, we are left with the "real"
family cases, those alleging emotional harm arising out of the relationship
between the litigants.14
8
Because these parties are complaining about interaction that occurs on
an intense day to day basis, courts have hesitated to become involved. Al-
though the concern that courts could be flooded with trivialities is legiti-
mate, more careful analysis of the specific elements of the emotional distress
tort would eliminate much of this judicial hesitation.
Most courts have focused their attention on the element requiring that
the defendant's conduct be outrageous.' 4 9 As a practical matter, severe
emotional distress, another element of the tort, may be inferred from outra-
geous conduct, according to the Restatement.' 50 Unfortunately, the Re-
statement's explanation of just what constitutes outrageous conduct is not
very helpful, speaking in terms of "atrocious,. . . utterly intolerable."' 15 1 In
fact, the Restatement's treatment indicates that the requirement of outra-
geous behavior by the defendant may be the most ill-defined and amorphous
of the tort's elements.
Perhaps the more reaonable way for a court to proceed would be to first
determine whether or not defendant intended to and has, in fact, caused
plaintiff serious mental distress. In many instances of emotional family in-
teraction, plaintiff will have difficulty proving that defendant intended to
injure plaintiff or knew to a substantial certainty 15 2 that emotional distress
would result. In even more instances, plaintiff will be unable to show severe
mental anguish. 153 By analyzing these factors, many of the petty complaints
that could arise would be eliminated without a trial.'
54
Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (jury
verdict for plaintiff upheld).
148. Se supra text accompanying notes 63-69, 72-73, 112-113, 118, 120, 122.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
150. "Severe distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous charac-
ter of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 46, comment j (1965). See also Note, Abduction of Child By
Noncustodial Parent: Damages For Custodial Parent's Mental Distress, 46 Mo. L. REV. 829, 835-36
(1981) (abduction of child is significant evidence that distress was suffered).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 46, comment d (1965). This definition has been
criticized as being circular. Theis, The Intentional Inftction of Emotional Distress." A Needfor Limits
on Liability, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 275, 290 (1978).
152. See supra note 14.
153. See supra note 16. For example, if a husband and wife have a fight, it will be difficult to
show more than a temporary anguish. Moreover, the intent element and the distress suffered
elements are more definite than the outrageous conduct requirement, and may serve to defeat
the cause of action.
154. To survive a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, plaintiff's allegations would
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If, however, defendant intended to harm plaintiff in a serious way and
succeeded, the next question to be addressed is whether or not the conduct
was outrageous. What is or is not outrageous may be more precisely deter-
mined by balancing the parties' interests. 15 5 Such a balancing approach is
certainly not new to the law. It is basic to the defense of privilege,' 56 and is
the core of the reasonableness determination in negligence. 157 In fact, this
accommodation of competing interests underlies much of tort law.i
58
Approaching the issue of outrageousness from the perspective of com-
peting interests has the additional advantage of lending more certainty to
determinations made in situations difficult to evaluate because of the rela-
tionship of the parties.i 59 Traditionally, the intimate nature of familial in-
teraction and the attendant notions of one's implied consent to such
relationships prompted judicial reluctance. But, this new approach may
stimulate more judicial confidence since the answer is derived by comparing
the interests defendant is promoting with the interests being harmed, instead
of by deciding whether something "looks" outrageous.160
In some cases it appears that defendant, by the conduct complained of,
is merely exercising a right established by the courts or the legislature. For
example, in Przybyla v. Przyby/a,i6 i plaintiff's complaint alleged that defend-
ant sought an abortion, which is her constitutionally protected right. In
such a situation, defendant's interest is paramount over plaintiff's more gen-
eralized interest in being free from emotional disturbance. Of course, if de-
fendant takes action not intended to further his or her own interest but to
harm plaintiff's, the balance could tip against defendant. 162 Similarly, if the
only allegations are that a party is seeking a divorce, as one is entitled to do
have to indicate a mental reaction more serious than a headache or a few sleepless nights.
Swanson v. Swanson, 121 Ill. App. 2d. 182, 257 N.E.2d 194 (1970).
155. See generally Hochman, Outrageousness and Privdege in the Law of Emotional Dzstress--a Sug-
gestion, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 61 (1961) (suggesting a qualified-privilege approach to emotional
distress claims).
156. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 16, at 98-99.
157. Id.
158. See generally Green, The Study & Teaching of Tort Law, 34 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1955)
(describing the public policy considerations underlying the judiciary's balancing role); W.
PROSSER, supra note 5, § 3, at 14-16.
159. It may seem easier to establish defendant's lack of justification under this new ap-
proach than his or her outrageous conduct under the old. Nonetheless, many cases will be
eliminated by a consideration of the intent and distress suffered elements. If having established
those elements, plaintiff shows defendant's lack of justification, plaintiff may be entitled to re-
covery. See Hochman, supra note 155, at 67-68. Liability would probably not be expanded
since a careful consideration of all the elements would eliminate most complaints, but in a more
analytically satisfying way.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d (1965). Since this is a new ap-
proach, this article suggests its use in the "real" as opposed to the "tangential" family cases.
Once a court realizes that the family relationship is irrelevant in the "tangential" cases, it ought
to be able to proceed with the traditional analysis. But where the family relationship is rele-
vant, and courts tend to dismiss without sufficient analysis, a more structured approach may be
helpful.
161. 87 Wis. 2d 441, 275 N.W.2d 112 (1978).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment g (1965) states: "The actor is
never liable, for example, where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a
permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional
distress." If defendant acts in an impermissible way, the case would be analogous to the loss of a
qualified privilege to defame. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 603 (1977).
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under state law, 163 the conduct cannot be outrageous. Such an approach
would eliminate the fear voiced by the Burnette v. Wahl 164 majority that any
divorcing parent would be liable for the distress inflicted on his or her child
because of the dissolution.
Directly contrary are cases where defendant violates an established
right of plaintiff or abrogates an established duty owed to plaintiff. Again,
the balance of interests already has been established by the courts or the
legislature, and if the plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress by de-
fendant's intentional act, defendant will be hard pressed to argue the action
is not outrageous. Although a specific duty regarding their relationship may
be embodied in a criminal statute, 165 duties also may be implied from civil
statutes. 166
The approach suggested in this article would lead to a result contrary to
that reached in Bumette,16 7 where the court found the emotional distress tort
inapplicable to the parent-child relationship. Thus, where plaintiff child
complains of maternal abandonment, plaintiffs right to be cared for is pro-
tected by statute in every jurisdiction.168 Since the legislatures have spoken
at length regarding the rights of children and their concerns with their wel-
fare,169 the balance between the parents' freedom of action and the child's
right to care already has been fixed. Where the child suffers severe distress,
and abandonment obviously affects mental as well as physical well-being, 1
70
the complaint should be actionable.
Similarly, defendant's bigamy, which was the basis for plaintiffs com-
163. H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 788 (3d ed. 1980).
164. 284 Or. 705, 716, 588 P.2d 1105, 1111-12 (1978).
165. See, e.g., infra, text accompanying notes 169-70. The analysis would then be very simi-
lar to that of using a violation of statute to establish negligence. W. PROSSER,supra note 5, § 36,
at 190. Note, however, that this is not a suggestion that a private right of action arises from the
statute. Rather, plaintiff will have to prove the elements of the tort. The violation of duty helps
establish the outrageousness of the behavior.
166. See mnfia text accompanying notes 173-77.
167. 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
168. See Katz. Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975) for a
compilation of statutes applicable in all jurisdictions.
169. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1011 (McKinney 1983). § 1011 states as the purpose of
the act:
to establish procedures to help protect children from injury or mistreatment and to
help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional well-being. It is designed to pro-
vide a due process of law for determining when the state . . . may intervene against
the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so that his needs are properly met.
Id.
The purpose clause of the Oregon statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 419.474 (1981 Repl. Part) states:
The provisions . . . shall be liberally construed to the end that a child coming within
the jurisdiction of the court may receive such care, guidance and control, preferably in
his own home, as will lead to the child's welfare and the best interest of the public, and
that when a child is removed from the control of his parents the court may secure for
him care that best meets the needs of the child.
Id.
170. Studies of foster children's adjustment have noted their trauma on separation from the
parents and difficulties in establishing new, sound relationships. See H. MAAS & R. ENGLER,
CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS 356 (1959); Maas, Highlights of the Foster Care Project." Introduc-
tion, CHILD WELFARE, July 1959, at 5; Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 599, 623-25 (1973).
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plaint in Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey,' 7 1 is universally condemned, 172 and
would not be accorded much weight in a balancing test. Accordingly, de-
fendant's interest in committing a criminal act will not compare favorably to
plaintiffs interest in not being subjected to the humiliation and anguish of
learning that her marriage is void. In fact, defendant's behavior appears
actionable as outrageous.
Lastly, the New York Court of Appeals decision in Weicker v. Wecker,1
73
may be questioned. Defendant's first wife alleged emotional distress because
of the defendant's procurement of an illegal Mexican divorce and his remar-
riage. 174 Although defendant had the right to divorce plaintiff under state
law, he only had the right to divorce legally, and had a duty not to divorce
illegally. Assuming an illegal divorce, it follows that defendant owed plain-
tiff duty not to remarry. 175 Again, it would seem defendant's failure to act
within the laws, and plaintiffs resulting emotional distress, would tip the
balance away from defendant. 176 Under this reasoning, the Weicker 177 trial
court's decision is more convincing.
Where defendant is neither protecting nor violating a clearly estab-
lished right, a more detailed investigation of each of the parties' interests is
necessary. In Wiener v. Wiener, 178 for example, defendant alleged in her
counterclaim that plaintiff was abusive and told her he did not love her.
Obviously, plaintiff was exercising his right of free speech. Although that
right has never been an absolute, 179 the ability to speak one's mind in the
family context has greater value than the peace of mind of the person listen-
ing. Because the family's functioning depends on open and free communica-
tion, even negative give and take is necessary. Accordingly, this
communication does fall within the "assumed risks" of the relationship.
A similar situation occurred in Hansen v. Hansen 180 where a child alleged
that his mother fought with him over his drug usage and sent him away to
school.' 8 ' Defendant's interest in disciplining her child is quite strong
8 2
compared to the child's interest in freedom of action and tranquility. 8 3 Be-
171. 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190 (1941).
172. There are both civil and criminal sanctions for bigamy. H. CLARK, supra note 163, at
120. There is, however, a strong presumption of the validity of the most recent marriage. See,
e.g., Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal App. 3d 209, 215, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210, 214 (1976); Johnson v.
Young, 372 A.2d 992, 994 (D.C. 1977).
173. 22 N.Y.2d 8, 237 N.E.2d 876, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1968) (per curiam).
174. See Weicker v. Weicker, 53 Misc. 2d 570, 279 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1967),rev'd, 28 A.D.2d 138,
283 N.Y.S.2d 385, aft'd, 22 N.Y.2d 8, 237 N.E.2d 876, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1968).
175. This duty is similar to that inMashunkashey, 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190, but runs to the
first wife instead of the second.
176. An interesting issue at trial would have been the cause in fact issue. Plaintiff would
have had to prove that it was the illegal divorce and remarriage which caused her distress, not
that defendant wanted to get a divorce, to which he was entitled.
177. 53 Misc. 2d 570, 279 N.Y.S.2d 852.
178. 84 A.D.2d 814, 444 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1981).
179. Liability for defamation restricts one's freedom of speech. Liability for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress can flow from spoken words. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 12.
180. 43 Colo. App. 525, 608 P.2d 364 (1979).
181. Id. at 526, 608 P.2d at 365.
182. There is a well-recognized privilege to discipline children. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 147-155 (1965).
183. Although there has been an upsurge of interest in the field of children's rights, legally
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cause it appears here that defendant was exercising her responsibility to her
child, not abrogating it as in Burnelte,'8 4 the allegations should not be
actionable.
In the Vance 185 case, referred to above, defendant married plaintiff not
knowing his prior divorce was still pending.'8 6 Although he discovered it
shortly thereafter, he did not inform plaintiff until twenty years later when
he wanted to divorce her.18 7 Conceding that defendant was unaware of the
problem at the time of the marriage, plaintiff complained of his failure to
alert her when he did find out.' 8 Unfortunately, the court's conclusion that
defendant could not have intended plaintiff distress, since he could not have
foreseen the unhappy circumstances when he did tell her, is flawed. 189
Again, a balancing test answering the following questions would be en-
lightening. Why did he keep the void marriage a secret? What interest did
defendant have in not disclosing the truth compared to plaintiff's distress
when she did learn the true status of their marriage? Clearly, her distress
could have been obviated by defendant's early disclosure. Therefore, de-
fendant's conduct is unjustified.
Somewhat more difficult is the Browning v. Browntng 190 decision. In that
case, plaintiff complained of his wife's consorting with a third party, bestow-
ing her companionship, affections and society upon him, and secluding her-
self with him. 191 Assuming that plaintiff is alleging defendant's adultery, the
interests asserted are much more closely balanced. Plaintiff claimed an in-
terest in a faithful spouse,' 92 while defendant countered that she should have
great sexual freedom. At least one author has suggested that changing mores
indicate: "the rights of the spouse flowing from the marital relationship
should no longer be conclusively presumed to include a monopoly interest in
his or her partner's sexual intercourse."' 193 In fact, there is even some sup-
port for her argument that a damages award for adultery would violate her
constitutional right to privacy.'
94
In jurisdictions where the criminal conversation action against third
parties still exists, some judicial balancing of these types of interests has al-
ready been done, and plaintiff's right to damages for loss of an exclusive
spousal sexual relationship has been sanctioned. Even where the action has
enforceable rights are limited. See generally Rodham, Children's Rights." A Legal Perspective, in
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21 (P. Vardin & I. Brody eds. 1979).
184. 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
185. 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979).
186. Id. at 493, 408 A.2d at 729.
187. Id. at 493, 408 A.2d at 729-30.
188. Id. at 492-93, 408 A.2d at 729.
189. See id. at 506, 408 A.2d at 736-37
190. 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
191. Id. at 407.
192. Most couples, unless they have mutually agreed otherwise, expect to have an exclusive
sexual relationship with their spouse. Adultery is a ground for divorce in most states. H.
CLARK, supra note 163, at 815.
193. Note, The Case for Retention of Causes of Action for Intentional Interference With the Marital
Relationshto, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 426, 433 (1972).
194. Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 283-84, 365 A.2d 147, 153 (1976) (Manderino, J.,
concurring); Kyle v. Albert, 2 Faro. L. Rep. 2361 (1976).
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been abrogated,1 95 that right has not necessarily been eliminated.
196 But
the trend toward abolishing such causes of action shows a lessened concern
with protection of this type of interest, and indicates that the balance may
swing toward defendant's interest in sexual freedom.
1 97
In summary, where defendant's interference with plaintiff's equanimity
could be accomplished as well by an outsider, cases should be treated like
any other emotional distress case. Where, however, the allegations involve
complaints about the parties' relationship, a clearer analytical structure may
alleviate judicial hesitation over involvement in family matters and concerns
over a flow of petty complaints which could arise because of the nature of
that family relationship.
CONCLUSION
The intentional infliction of emotional distress tort has developed from
a "new tort" to a well-accepted cause of action in a relatively short time
span. Its elements are fairly well articulated, but suffer from a lack of preci-
sion in application.
As the mental distress tort developed, intrafamily immunities were abol-
ished. Such developments naturally raise questions concerning the applica-
tion of the emotional distress tort in the newly available field of family
liability.
Some courts have responded to the challenge by refusing to recognize
the claims. This article suggests that such an approach ignores the raison
d'etre of tort law, compensation, and leaves plaintiff without a remedy.
There is no inherent reason why emotional distress among family members
should not be compensable. What is needed, however, is a clearer analysis of
the facts of the case and in those situations truly involving the family rela-
tionship, a more specific inquiry into what constitutes outrageous behavior.
Some decisions categorically deny the availability of the cause of action
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress when it is not even relevant
that a family is involved. Cases denying a cause of action when plaintiff
complains of defendant's interference with visitation or failure to make ali-
mony or support payments could be better analogized to cases involving sim-
ilar interferences among strangers. The child-snatching cases, by
recognizing a cause of action, implement this approach.
Where the facts do involve a disruption of the relationship between the
two parties to the suit, other problems are presented. There is a legitimate
concern that the close nature of the relationship may lead to an unwieldy
number of trivial complaints. Some courts may have been unwilling to de-
termine whether the conduct was outrageous on the Restatement's amorphous
standards. A balancing of the parties' interests would, it is suggested, lend
more certainty to that determination and present a more acceptable stan-
195. See supra text accompanying note 55.
196. See supra text accompanying note 56.
197. Note, however, if one's concern is with vague allegations of mistreatment there are
attendant difficulties of proof, while allegations regarding socializing with a third person would
be fairly definite and susceptible of proof.
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dard for liabilty. Family members do inflict emotional distress on one an-
other, and where that distress is intended and results, the defendant who has
acted without justification should be liable.

